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aBstraCt
As is well known, Putnam changed his philosophical position on a number of  occa-
sions throughout his career. In this paper, I reconsider the position of  internal realism 
which Putnam defended from the mid-1970’s until around 1990. The paper opens 
with a discussion of  the position that Putnam called “metaphysical realism”, since 
his internal realism emerged out of  a critique of  that position. The paper then briefly 
presents the internal realist view as one which involves an epistemic conception of  
truth, as well as an anti-realist metaphysical outlook on which objects depend on 
conceptual scheme. The paper then provides a survey of  the key objections to internal 
realism which emerged in the ensuing debate with defenders of  realism. The paper 
concludes with a brief  consideration of  the relevance of  Putnam’s later adoption of  
a direct realist theory of  perception with respect to the issue of  realism.
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rEsuMEn
Como es sabido, Putnam cambió de postura filosófica en varias ocasiones durante su 
carrera. En este artículo reconsidero la postura del realismo interno que Putnam de-
fendió desde mediados de la década de 1970 hasta aproximadamente 1990. El artículo 
comienza con una discusión de la postura que Putnam llamó “realismo metafísico”, 
puesto que su realismo interno surgió de una crítica a esta. El artículo presenta breve-
mente, a continuación, la perspectiva del realista interno como una que implica la con-
cepción epistémica de la verdad al igual que una perspectiva metafísica antirrealista en 
la que los objetos dependen del esquema conceptual. El artículo aporta a continuación 
una visión global de las objeciones clave al realismo interno que surgieron en el debate 
resultante con los defensores del realismo. El artículo concluye con nuna breve con-
sideración de la relevancia de la adopción posterior por parte de Putnam de un teoría 
de la percepción basada en el realismo directo, con respecto al problema del realismo.
PaLaBras CLavE: Hilary Putnam, realismo interno, realismo metafísico, realismo 
directo, teoría epistémica de la verdad.
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1. introduCtion
In this paper, I reconsider the internal realist position that Hilary Putnam defended 
from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s.1 My way into the issue is to approach internal 
realism from the perspective of  an epistemologist who endorses the traditional view 
that knowledge is justified true belief. We will leave that perspective behind as we 
come to grips with the details of  the internal realist position. But it is, I think, a nice 
way to introduce the topic. Among other things, it draws attention to the fact that 
the internal realist is able to maintain a distinction between knowledge and justified 
belief  despite adopting an epistemic conception of  truth.
According to the traditional analysis of  knowledge, an epistemic subject 
knows some proposition if  and only if  the subject believes the proposition, is 
justified in believing the proposition and the proposition is in fact true. On this 
analysis, the truth condition and the justification condition are distinct conditions 
that must separately be satisfied for the subject to have knowledge. But we may 
ask what the relationship is between justification and truth. What if  they are 
the same thing? What if  truth just is justification? If  truth and justification are 
the same, there would be no difference between knowledge and justified belief. 
Knowledge would collapse into justified belief. In order to distinguish knowledge 
from justified belief, truth must be distinct from justification.
Here a distinction may be drawn between theories of  truth which take truth to 
be a non-epistemic property or relation (e.g. correspondence) and theories which 
take it to be an epistemic property or relation (e.g. coherence). If  truth is non-
epistemic, justification may be distinguished from truth. A non-epistemic notion 
of  truth avoids the collapse of  knowledge into justified belief. By contrast, if  truth 
is taken to be an epistemic notion, then knowledge may collapse into justified 
belief. This is evidently the case if  truth simply is justification. If  truth simply is 
justification, there is no difference between justified belief  and knowledge.
The hallmark of  Putnam’s internal realist position is the idea that truth is an 
epistemic notion. But Putnam avoids the collapse of  knowledge into justified 
belief. He is able to avoid the collapse because he proposes an epistemic view of  
truth on which truth is not simply identical with justification. Putnam takes truth 
1 The dating is approximate. Michael Devitt refers to Putnam’s internal realist phase as his 
“interim period”. He specifies it as the period from 1976 to 1989 (Devitt 2013, p. 102). In his 
intellectual autobiography, Putnam appears to date his renunciation of  the internalist view to 
the time of  the Gifford conference in St Andrews in 1990 (2015, p. 83).
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to be ideal justified belief  rather than ordinary everyday justification. Ordinary 
everyday justification is something less than ideal justification. If  truth is ideal 
justification, knowledge and justification may be distinguished. For what is 
required for knowledge on Putnam’s view is not just that a belief  be justified in the 
ordinary everyday sense. It must also be true in the sense of  being ideally justified.
With this as a foretaste of  Putnam’s internal realism, let us turn to the topic. 
My plan is to present the basic outlines of  the internal realist position, and then 
to provide an overview of  some of  the main themes of  the critical reaction of  
realists to the internalist view. Putnam proposes internal realism as an alternative 
to a position that he characterizes as metaphysical realism. In section 2, I will 
consider Putnam’s characterization of  metaphysical realism. Then, in section 3, I 
will consider the main outlines of  the internal realist position as Putnam presents 
the view. In section 4, I will canvas a number of  objections that have been levelled 
on the part of  realism against Putnam’s characterization of  metaphysical realism 
as well as internal realism. As we will see, an important task that realists must 
undertake in responding to Putnam is the task of  dismantling the characterization 
of  metaphysical realism that he seeks to impose on realists. I will discuss the 
metaphysical commitments of  realism in section 5. In section 6, I will consider 
arguments that realists may present on behalf  of  their position, since arguing 
against internal realism is not all that needs to be done in order to establish realism. 
Finally, in section 7 I will briefly note the implications of  Putnam’s later direct (or 
“natural”) realist theory of  perception for the issue of  realism.
2. MEtaPhysiCaL rEaLisM
In developing the internal realist position, Putnam contrasts it with an opposing 
external realist position that he usually refers to as metaphysical realism. According 
to the metaphysical realist view, as Putnam construes the position, the world is 
independent of  our thought about it. The world contains a determinate set of  
objects which exist independently of  human thought and language. We employ 
the referring expressions of  our language to speak about these mind-independent 
objects.
This metaphysical realist view of  the independence of  the world is associated 
with a certain way of  thinking about the nature of  truth. The independence of  
the world fits with a correspondence conception of  truth. If  we say that an object 
has a property, and the object does in fact have that property, then what we say 
corresponds to the way the world is, so is true. It is the way that the object is 
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that determines that what we say about it is true (or false). Truth has nothing to 
do with what we believe about the object or with whether our beliefs about the 
object are justified (or not). Truth has to do with the way the object in fact is, 
independently of  us or what we think about it.
The metaphysical realist view of  truth and the mind-independent character 
of  reality gives rise to a conception of  truth as non-epistemic. As Putnam puts it:
…THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of  any particular representation we 
have of  it – indeed, it is held that we might be unable to represent THE WORLD 
correctly at all (e.g. we might all be ‘brains in a vat’ …) … The most important 
consequence of  metaphysical realism is that truth is supposed to be radically non-
epistemic.… (1978, p. 125)
For the metaphysical realist, truth is not defined in terms of  epistemic criteria 
(e.g. justification, evidence, coherence). As such, it is “radically non-epistemic”. To 
bring out the implications of  such a non-epistemic conception of  truth, Putnam 
reflects on the possibility of  an ideal theory. The ideal theory is the theory that 
would result if  science were pursued to the ideal limit of  inquiry. Such a theory 
would maximally satisfy all epistemic constraints. What is the truth-value of  the 
ideal theory?
…let T1 be an ideal theory, by our lights. Lifting restrictions on our actual all-
too-finite powers, we can imagine T1 to have every property except objective truth 
– which is left open – that we like. E.g. T1 can be imagined complete, consistent, 
to predict correctly all observation sentences (as far as we can tell), to meet 
whatever ‘operational constraints’ there are (if  these are ‘fuzzy’, let T1 seem clearly 
to meet them), to be ‘beautiful’, ‘simple’, ‘plausible’, etc. The supposition under 
consideration is that T1 might be all this and still be (in reality) false. (1978, p. 125)
An ideal theory is one that maximally satisfies all epistemic criteria. Truth is not 
defined in terms of  epistemic criteria. So the fact that a theory maximally satisfies 
all epistemic criteria does not entail that the theory is true. There is a conceptual 
gap between truth and being an ideal theory. Thus, metaphysical realism allows 
that an ideal theory may in fact be false.
For Putnam, a philosopher who adopts metaphysical realism is placed in a 
precarious position. To see this, consider where the human subject is situated within 
the metaphysical realist scenario. In describing the world and the relation between 
human thought and reality, it is we who speak. We are the ones who formulate 
the metaphysical realist position. So it is we humans who describe ourselves as 
situated in the world surrounded by mind-independent objects. Putnam thinks 
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this requires us to adopt a special perspective with respect to ourselves and the 
world. To describe the metaphysical realist scenario, we must occupy a perspective 
outside ourselves. We must adopt an external perspective:
On this perspective, the world consists of  some fixed totality of  mind-independent 
objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of  ‘the way the world 
is’. Truth involves some sort of  correspondence relation between words or 
thought-signs and external things and sets of  things. I shall call this perspective 
the externalist perspective, because its favourite point of  view is a God’s Eye point 
of  view. (1981, p. 49)
Metaphysical realism presupposes the ability to step outside ourselves to 
occupy an external standpoint. It requires us to put ourselves in God’s position. 
From God’s position, we may describe the way reality is, as well as our relationship 
to reality. So metaphysical realism requires a God’s Eye point of  view.
The above passage brings out two further aspects of  metaphysical realism. 
The first is that “the world consists of  some fixed totality of  mind-independent 
objects”. The second is that “There is exactly one true and complete description 
of  ‘the way the world is’.” That there is exactly one correct description of  reality 
appears to follow from the claim that the world consists of  a “fixed totality of  
mind-independent objects” together with the view that truth is a “correspondence 
relation”. For if  there is a fixed totality of  objects, one might suppose that there 
may only be one true description that corresponds to the way those objects in 
fact are. Moreover, there will only be one complete description that accurately 
represents all those objects.
Let us now turn to Putnam’s criticism of  the position of  metaphysical realism. 
I will begin with Putnam’s objection to the God’s Eye point of  view. As we have 
seen, Putnam takes metaphysical realism to be committed to the possibility that 
we may adopt a God’s Eye point of  view. But no sense may be made of  this. It 
is impossible to remove ourselves from our human perceptual and conceptual 
situation. We cannot step out of  our heads to adopt an external view. We cannot 
place ourselves in the position of  God to look down from on high at the human 
situation. As Putnam put the point:
There is no God’s Eye point of  view that we can know or usefully imagine; there 
are only the various points of  view of  actual persons reflecting various interests 
and purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve (1981, p. 50)
The upshot is this. We cannot shed our human perspective and occupy an 
external standpoint. So the metaphysical realist picture breaks down. It breaks 
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down because it assumes that we may put ourselves in an external position in order 
to describe the metaphysical realist position. We cannot adopt such a position. So 
we cannot even adopt the position from which to propose metaphysical realism 
in the first place.
Apart from the God’s Eye point of  view, Putnam points to another problem. 
Metaphysical realism makes radical scepticism possible. It is unable to rule out the 
possibility that we are subject to a massive illusion. We might be under an illusion 
created by a Cartesian evil demon or, in Putnam’s preferred scenario, we might be 
brains in a vat:
…imagine that a human being (you can imagine this to be yourself) has been 
subjected to an operation by an evil scientist. The person’s brain (your brain) has 
been removed from the body and placed in a vat of  nutrients which keeps the 
brain alive. The nerve endings have been connected to a super-scientific computer 
which causes the person whose brain it is to have the illusion that everything is 
perfectly normal. There seem to be people, objects, the sky, etc.; but really all the 
person (you) is experiencing is the result of  electronic impulses travelling from the 
computer to the nerve endings. The computer is so clever that if  the person tries 
to raise his hand, the feedback from the computer will cause him to ‘see’ and ‘feel’ 
the hand being raised. (1981, pp. 5-6)
Putnam holds that such radical sceptical scenarios are not genuine possibilities. 
In his view, this further undermines metaphysical realism. The problem is that 
metaphysical realism makes it seem as if  something that is not a genuine possibility 
is a genuine possibility. Metaphysical realism mistakenly allows that we may be 
brains in a vat.
More specifically, Putnam presents an objection against the brain in a vat scenario 
that turns on considerations about reference. In the scenario, brains in a vat are 
connected to a computer. The language employed by a brain in a vat does not have 
appropriate referential connections to the world. The term ‘vat’, as employed by a 
brain in a vat, does not refer to a real vat at all. Because their words do not refer to 
items in the world outside the vat, they cannot say truly that they are brains in a vat:
… ‘vat’ refers to vats in the image in vat-English, or something related … but 
certainly not to real vats, since the use of  ‘vat’ in vat-English has no causal 
connection to real vats … part of  the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is that 
we aren’t brains in a vat in the image (i.e. what we are ‘hallucinating’ isn’t that we 
are brains in a vat). So, if  we are brains in a vat, then the sentence ‘We are brains 
in a vat’ says something false (if  it says anything). In short, if  we are brains in a 
vat, then ‘We are brains in a vat’ is false. So it is (necessarily) false. (1981, pp. 14-5)
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In other words, a brain in a vat may think the words “I am a brain in a vat”. 
But the word ‘vat’ as used by the brain does not refer to a real vat. Given the 
failure of  appropriate reference, the sentence “I am a brain in a vat” cannot be 
true. So I am not a brain in a vat.
The idea that, despite appearances, we might really be brains in a vat is a 
further instance of  the idea that truth is “radically non-epistemic”. As we have 
previously seen, Putnam employs the idea of  an ideal theory to bring out the 
commitment of  metaphysical realism to the non-epistemic nature of  truth. The 
metaphysical realist allows that the ideal theory at the end of  science might be 
false. In a similar way, the metaphysical realist allows that we might be brains in 
a vat even though all of  the evidence available to us suggests otherwise. In both 
the case of  the ideal theory being false and our being brains in a vat, the truth is 
distinct from the way we are justified in believing the world to be.
In fact, Putnam opposes the view that the ideal theory might be false. Though 
metaphysical realism is right to distinguish truth from justification, this does not 
entail that truth is distinct from all justification. Putnam notes that the sentence 
‘The Earth is flat’ might be rationally acceptable at one time but not at another 
(1981, p. 55). But it cannot be true at one time and not at another (or the Earth 
would change shape). The metaphysical realist captures this point by insisting that 
truth and justification are completely distinct. But it is not necessary for truth to 
be non-epistemic for it to be distinct from justification. It suffices for truth to 
be an idealization of  rational acceptability. If  truth is ideal rational acceptability, 
then it is distinct from ordinary rational acceptability. As for the issue of  the ideal 
theory being false, suppose that truth is idealized justification. The ideal theory 
must satisfy all epistemic constraints perfectly. It must be epistemically ideal, i.e. 
it must be ideally justified. But, if  truth is ideal justification, the ideal theory just 
is true, since it is ideally justified. So, if  truth is ideal justification, the ideal theory 
cannot be false.2
2 Putnam offered a proof  that an ideal theory cannot be false, which turns on model-theoretic 
considerations. Any consistent theory must have a model where a model is an interpretation 
of  the terms of  a theory that makes it true. An ideal theory will be consistent, since consis-
tency is an epistemic criterion that an ideal theory must satisfy. Since an ideal theory satisfies 
all epistemic criteria and has a model, it must be true. This is a greatly simplified version of  
the argument given in (Putnam, 1978, pp. 125-6). For critical discussion, see Devitt (1991, 
pp. 225-30).
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3. intErnaL rEaLisM
Having considered some of  Putnam’s key objections to metaphysical realism, 
let us now turn to the position of  internal realism with which Putnam proposed 
to replace metaphysical realism. As has previously been mentioned, the central 
idea of  internal realism is that truth is an epistemic notion, namely, idealized 
justification. To distinguish truth from justification, Putnam says that truth is 
idealized justification rather than ordinary justification. Given that truth is taken 
to be a form of  epistemic justification, internal realism adopts an epistemic 
conception of  truth.
An important source of  Putnam’s internal realist view is an approach to the 
understanding of  language that is verificationist in spirit. What Putnam described 
as “verificationist semantics” was not a strict empiricist conception of  meaning in 
the sense of  earlier logical positivism. Rather, Putnam took the view that linguistic 
understanding is to be analysed in terms of  verification conditions as opposed to 
truth conditions. At this stage in the development of  his thought, Putnam was 
closely engaged with the work of  Michael Dummett who endorsed a similar anti-
realist approach to understanding. Putnam also took a verificationist approach to 
linguistic understanding to be the only approach compatible with the functionalist 
view of  the mind that he at that stage upheld (1983, p. 143; 2012, p. 78). One 
consequence of  Putnam’s verificationist approach to understanding is that the 
notion of  truth itself  is to be understood in verificationist terms. The notion of  
truth is to be understood in terms of  the conditions under which it is appropriate 
to apply the term ‘true’ to an assertion. This is what gives rise to Putnam’s internal 
realist notion of  truth.
At one point in Reason, Truth and History, Putnam characterizes the internal 
realist notion of  truth as follows:
‘Truth’, in an internalist view, is some sort of  (idealized) rational acceptability 
– some sort of  ideal coherence of  our beliefs with each other and with our 
experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief  system – 
and not correspondence with mind-independent or discourse-independent ‘states 
of  affairs’. (1981, pp. 49-50)
On this construal, truth is a thoroughly epistemic property which accrues 
to a belief  in virtue of  being ideally justified. It is not a non-epistemic relation 
of  correspondence that a belief  or assertion enters into with extra-linguistic 
reality. As such, the internalist construal of  truth stands in sharp contrast with the 
metaphysical realist conception of  truth.
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But the contrast between the internalist view and metaphysical realism is not 
restricted to disagreement about the nature of  truth. There is also significant 
contrast between the views at a metaphysical level. Internal realism reflects an 
anti-realist metaphysical perspective. At one point, Putnam comments that Kant 
may be regarded as having been the first advocate of  an internalist view of  truth 
(1981, p. 60). The Kantian anti-realist aspect of  internal realism may be brought 
out by considering the status of  objects. For the metaphysical realist, as we have 
seen, there is a “fixed totality of  mind-independent objects”. In contrast with 
metaphysical realism, the internalist throws the mind-independence of  objects 
into question.
For the internal realist, the world is not carved up into objects and kinds of  
objects prior to human classification. Rather, what objects and kinds of  objects 
there are depends upon conceptual scheme:
…signs do not intrinsically correspond to objects, independently of  how these 
signs are employed and by whom. But a sign that is actually employed in a particular 
way by a particular community of  users can correspond to particular objects within 
the conceptual scheme of  those users. ‘Objects’ do not exist independently of  
conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or 
another scheme of  description. Since the objects and the signs are alike internal 
to the scheme of  description, it is possible to say what matches what. (1981, p. 52)
On this view, reality is not divided up into objects and kinds in advance of  
human conceptual activity. Nor do they exist as such independently of  human 
thought. What objects and kinds of  objects there are depend upon choice of  
conceptual scheme. Thus, as opposed to metaphysical realism, the internal realist 
takes the world to be divided up into objects and kinds by our conceptual schemes.
4. oBjECtions
I now turn to criticism of  Putnam’s characterization of  metaphysical realism 
as well as of  the position of  internal realism. There are numerous ways in which 
realists may respond to Putnam. I focus on the objections that I find most telling. 
The first objection takes exception to Putnam’s characterization of  metaphysical 
realism. Next we will see that the realist need not be committed to there being just 
“one true and complete description” of  the world or to a “fixed totality of  mind-
independent objects”. We will also see that it is possible to challenge Putnam’s 
treatment of  the God’s Eye point of  view. Finally, we will consider an argument 
that the epistemic concept of  truth leads to idealism.
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The first objection is to the way in which Putnam characterizes the position 
of  metaphysical realism. For Putnam, metaphysical realism involves assumptions 
about reference, truth, the complete description of  the world, a fixed totality of  
objects, etc. But a realist who wishes to endorse a realist view with non-trivial 
metaphysical commitments may well deny that all of  these assumptions form part 
of  realism properly so-called. A realist might define realism in a more minimal 
way that is not committed to all of  these assumptions. Such a realist might rest 
content with the assertion that the world that we inhabit is an objective reality that 
exists independently of  human language and thought. Or they might merely be 
committed to the existence of  an “external world”.
Michael Devitt is an important representative of  this line of  thought. Devitt 
is a realist who takes realism as primarily a metaphysical position, and who adopts 
a more minimal construal of  the view. Devitt characterizes the view that he takes 
to be realism as follows:
‘Realism’: Tokens of  most current common-sense, and scientific, physical types 
objectively exist independently of  the mental. (2002, p. 13)
For Devitt, observable entities such as stones, trees and cats, as well as 
theoretical entities such as electrons, exist. His primary concern is with the 
existence of  tokens (e.g. particular stones or electrons) rather than of  types (cf. 
Devitt 1991, pp. 20-1). The point is not just that tokens of  such types of  entity 
exist. They are physical entities that exist objectively, independently of  whether 
we think about them.
Such a minimal characterization of  realism provides the basis for a first 
point of  response to Putnam. We may simply challenge the way in which Putnam 
characterizes metaphysical realism. Putnam builds excessive commitments into 
the doctrine. A minimal, restricted form of  realism may resist or simply avoid 
some of  the objections that Putnam levels against metaphysical realism.
This is not a merely terminological point. Putnam is free to introduce a 
stipulative definition on which the expression ‘metaphysical realism’ refers to the 
position that he characterizes as such. The problem is that one might just as well 
have taken the expression to refer to a realist position which is metaphysical in 
nature, but without the detailed commitments that Putnam builds into the doctrine. 
One might just as well say that Putnam has misidentified the metaphysical realist 
position and attempted to burden it with a range of  detailed commitments that 
the position need not take on. To speak for myself, I am more inclined to say 
that Putnam has simply mischaracterized metaphysical realism than that he has 
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introduced a stipulative definition for the expression. It may seem as if  I am mis-
takenly treating a terminological point as a substantive one. But I do think there 
is something positively misleading about the way in which Putnam employs the 
expression.3
Let us now consider some of  the detailed commitments with which Putnam 
attempts to saddle the metaphysical realist. We may begin with the claim that, for 
the metaphysical realist, “There is exactly one true and complete description of  
‘the way the world is’”. Why must the realist be committed to this claim? It seems 
to be a non-trivial and potentially troublesome addition to the basic ontological 
claim of  the realist that there is a mind-independent reality.
To see this, consider Devitt’s version of  realism. According to Devitt’s construal 
of  the doctrine, the entities of  common sense and science exist objectively. This 
is a claim about the objective existence of  entities of  certain kinds. It makes no 
mention of  a “true and complete description” of  the world. It does not require that 
there be any true and complete description of  the world. It is entirely possible that 
no such true and complete description has ever been or ever will be formulated. 
Nor does the claim of  objective existence entail that there is only one true and 
complete description of  the world. So far as the existence claim is concerned, there 
might be more than one true and complete description of  the way the world is.
It is, in any event, not clear what is meant by “one true and complete descrip-
tion of  ‘the way the world is’”. Would it be an accurate, detailed description of  
every single moment in the entire history of  the universe? This would be an 
extraordinarily long list! In practice, no such description is ever likely to exist. 
Perhaps one might think that such a description may in principle be formulated. 
But even to allow this is to concede too much. It is simply not clear that sense may 
be made of  such a description.4
Having seen that the idea of  “one true and complete description” is questio-
nable, let us turn to the claim that for the metaphysical realist there must be “a fixed 
totality of  mind-independent objects”. A similar point to the previous one applies. 
A minimal Devitt-style formulation of  realism says nothing about a “fixed totality” 
3 In his intellectual autobiography, Putnam discusses the issue that arose from the way he 
understood metaphysical realism and its failure to mesh with other philosophers’ understan-
ding of  the view. He writes: “Although I was usually impatient with critics who said “But you 
haven’t refuted my form of  metaphysical realism,” when “their” form was not the one I was 
talking about, I now sympathize with them” (Putnam 2015, p. 84).
4 My comments here are in the spirit of  similar remarks of  Hacking (1983, pp. 93-4).
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of  objects. The claim that commonsense and scientific entities objectively exist fails 
to commit the realist to the further claim that there is a fixed totality of  such entities.
Why might one think the existence claim entails a “fixed totality” of  objects? 
One reason for this emerges once metaphysical realism is brought into contrast 
with internal realism. For the internal realist, objects depend upon conceptual 
scheme. There may be different conceptual schemes. So different sets of  objects 
may exist, depending upon conceptual scheme. There is no fixed set of  objects that 
exists independently of  conceptual schemes. There are only the objects that exist 
within one or another conceptual scheme. By contrast with the internal realist, 
Putnam takes metaphysical realism to deny that what objects there are depends on 
conceptual scheme. Given that the metaphysical realist denies this, they may seem 
to be committed to a fixed totality of  objects. But it is not entirely obvious that a 
more minimal Devitt-style construal of  realism need be so committed. Perhaps 
one might think there are only the objects that there are, and there can only be 
one totality of  such objects. But the issue is not as straightforward as this suggests.
I will now explore this question by considering some remarks due to Ian 
Hacking, who doubts that realism requires commitment to a “fixed totality” of  
objects. In Representing and Intervening, Hacking provides sustained discussion of  
Putnam’s internal realism. At one point, he wonders whether the realist must be 
committed to the view that there is a fixed totality of  objects:
Why fixed? Why one totality? Consider only the banal example of  Eddington’s 
– there are two tables, namely the wooden table at which I am writing, and a 
certain bundle of  atoms. A realist about entities can well hold (a) there are mind-
independent tables, (b) there are mind-independent atoms, and (c) no set of  atoms 
is identical with this table at this instant. Atoms and tables have to do with different 
ways of  carving up the world. There is no fixed totality of  objects. (1983, p. 94)
Here Hacking allows that there are different ways of  “carving up the world”. 
This may suggest that he agrees with the internalist. But that is not quite the point. 
Hacking does agree that there is no fixed set of  objects. But he takes tables and 
atoms to be mind-independent. Tables and atoms reflect different ways in which 
the world may be carved up. But Hacking insists that the objects, under different 
ways of  carving the world up, do exist in a mind-independent manner. This is 
realist about the mind-independent existence of  objects.5
5 Like Hacking, Alan Musgrave also doubts that realism is committed to a fixed totality of  
objects. Musgrave’s concern turns on the question of  how the term ‘object’ works: “the term 
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We may now turn to Putnam’s objection to the God’s Eye view. Putnam 
calls metaphysical realism “externalist”, since “its favourite point of  view is a 
God’s Eye point of  view.” Putnam’s objection is twofold: (i) metaphysical realism 
requires a God’s Eye point of  view; (ii) it is impossible to adopt a God’s Eye point 
of  view. Putnam thinks that metaphysical realism requires a God’s Eye point of  
view because it is expressed from a perspective outside the human situation. It is 
as if  the metaphysical realist views our situation from God’s perspective. But we 
cannot adopt such a viewpoint. Nor can we “usefully imagine” one.
To assess this objection, let us ask whether it really is necessary to adopt a 
God’s Eye point of  view in order to formulate metaphysical realism. After all, 
we humans are the ones who formulate the doctrine. We formulate metaphysical 
realism as a hypothesis about ourselves and our relationship to the world around 
us. Metaphysical realism is our own hypothesis about our situation in the world. 
We are able to propose the doctrine as a hypothesis about our own situation. So 
we are able to formulate the doctrine from within our human perspective. We 
are not required to adopt a God’s Eye point of  view. Nor is adopting an external 
perspective as problematic as Putnam suggests. In cognitive ethology, we are able 
to empirically study the cognitive capacities of  non-human animals. Psychologists 
undertake the empirical study of  our own human cognitive capacities. Thus, in 
a certain sense, we are able to adopt an “external perspective” from which to 
investigate the relationship between knowing subjects and their environment.6
So far in this section, I have considered problems which relate to Putnam’s 
characterization of  metaphysical realism. I wish now to consider an objection that 
arises specifically with respect to Putnam’s internal realist position. Put simply, the 
objection is that internal realism leads to idealism. I will consider the objection 
in the form in which it is presented by Alan Musgrave. Musgrave focuses on the 
epistemic theory of  truth endorsed by internal realism.
Musgrave raises the question of  the relationship between the Tarskian T-scheme 
and epistemic theories of  truth. For an epistemic theory of  truth, truth is defined 
‘object’ is not an individuating expression or sortal predicate or ‘count noun’” (2001, p. 41). 
The general question “How many objects are there…?” has no definite answer. The more 
specific question “How many books are there on the table?” may have a definite answer. But 
realism need not be committed to the existence of  a “fixed totality” of  specific kinds of  things 
such as books or tables.
6 I develop both of  these points about the God’s Eye point of  view at greater length in my 
(2008, chapter 2).
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in terms of  a property of  belief, such as epistemic justification. What happens if  an 
epistemic theory of  truth is combined with the T-scheme? To illustrate what happens, 
Musgrave starts with a “silly epistemic truth theory”. The “silly” theory is as follows:
Necessarily, S is true if  and only if  Musgrave thinks that P. (1997, p. 493)
Combining the silly theory with the T-scheme yields (MT):
(MT) P if  and only if  Musgrave thinks that P. (1997, p. 493)
An example of  this is: “Frogs exist if  and only if  Musgrave thinks that frogs 
exist.” Musgrave takes (MT) to be obviously absurd: “It states my omniscience: it 
is false if  anything is the case that I do not think is the case. It is also false if  I have 
a false belief ” (1997, p. 493). The Musgrave theory of  truth can be defended if  
it is combined with “Musgrave-solipsism”. On Musgrave-solipsism, if  Musgrave 
thinks that P, P is the case. The way things are depends on what Musgrave thinks. 
If  Musgrave believes that P is the case, P is the case. If  Musgrave believes that P 
is not the case, P is not the case. But Musgrave dismisses Musgrave-solipsism as 
“a lunatic idealist metaphysic” (1997, p. 493).
According to Musgrave, similar absurdity applies to epistemic theories of  
truth of  the kind proposed by internal realism. In developing the point, Musgrave 
employs Brian Ellis’s version of  internal realism rather than Putnam’s.7 For Ellis, 
truth is what is right epistemically to believe. Given this, Musgrave presents a 
similar argument to the one we have just seen. Ellis’s theory of  truth may be 
formulated as follows:
Necessarily, S is true if  and only if  it is epistemically right to believe that S.
Take the claim that electrons exist. Suppose it is epistemically right to believe 
that electrons exist. In this case, ‘electrons exist’ is true in Ellis’s sense of  ‘true’. If  
we apply the T-scheme to ‘Electrons exist’, this yields:
‘Electrons exist’ is true if  and only if  electrons exist.
From this and Ellis’s theory of  truth, we arrive at:
(ET) Electrons exist if  and only if  it is epistemically right to believe that electrons 
exist. (1997, p. 494)
7 Rather than replace Ellis’s terminology with Putnam’s, I leave Musgrave’s wording unaltered. 
However, it should be clear that Musgrave’s argument may also be presented using Putnam-
style terminology, e.g. ideal rational acceptability or ideally justified.
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In a way similar to “Musgrave-solipsism”, (ET) makes the way things are 
depend on what we think. It makes the existence of  electrons depend upon our 
being in a certain epistemic state. That makes the existence of  electrons depend 
on thought. Musgrave takes this to be a form of  idealism. He takes this to be an 
absurd result, which should lead to the rejection of  the epistemic theory of  truth.
In presenting this objection to the internal realist conception of  truth, 
Musgrave assumes idealism to be absurd. On that assumption, showing that an 
epistemic theory of  truth leads to idealism constitutes a significant objection 
to the epistemic theory of  truth. But not all philosophers will take this to be 
an objection. Philosophers sympathetic to idealism may not find it absurd. So, 
in order to carry through the case for realism, we must develop arguments for 
realism. But, before turning to the case for realism, let us further consider the 
ontological commitments of  realism.
5. rEaLisM
As we have seen, Putnam’s characterization of  metaphysical realism is 
problematic. Realists may adopt a more minimal characterization of  their position 
than Putnam’s characterization of  metaphysical realism. For example, we have 
seen that Devitt formulates realism in terms of  the objective mind-independent 
existence of  tokens of  commonsense and scientific physical types. No doubt, 
many realists would be prepared to adopt a characterization of  realism similar to 
that employed by Devitt. Alternatively, they might simply rest content with the 
assertion that there is an objective reality or an “external world”.
In Devitt’s view, realism is a metaphysical thesis. It says nothing about truth. It 
has no semantic component. It is open to the realist to adopt a specific theory of  
truth, such as a correspondence theory or a minimalist account. But to do so is to 
adopt an optional extra that is added onto realism itself. Moreover, avoiding talk 
of  truth in the formulation of  realism has advantages. If  the notion of  truth is 
not employed in the formulation of  realism, it may be possible to avoid objections 
which make crucial use of  the notion of  truth. In the next section, I will focus 
on considerations on behalf  of  realism which treat it as a metaphysical doctrine 
without a semantic component. Before turning to that topic, let us consider the 
metaphysical commitments of  Devitt-style realism.
As we have seen, Devitt formulates realism as a claim about the objective 
existence of  certain kinds of  things, namely, tokens of  most commonsense 
and scientific physical types. This reflects the fact that realists are typically not 
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realists about every imaginable kind of  thing. Most realists assert the existence 
of  certain kinds of  things while rejecting the existence of  other kinds of  things. 
The point may be put in terms of  a distinction between global and local realism.8 
Global realism is unrestricted realism for which all kinds of  thing exist. Local 
realism is realism about things of  specific kinds. Typically, realists are local realists 
about specific kinds of  things, and local anti-realists about some other kinds of  
things. The contrast between global and local makes most sense in the context 
of  the contrast between realism and anti-realism. Some anti-realists are global 
anti-realists. Global anti-realists deny that there are any mind-independent things. 
Strong forms of  idealism are examples of  global anti-realist positions.
Devitt’s characterization of  realism combines two sorts of  local realism. The 
first is commonsense realism. This is realism about items of  ordinary common 
sense, such as tables. The second is scientific realism, which is realism about the 
well-established entities of  the sciences, such as atoms. Devitt restricts realism to 
physical things recognized by common sense or science. Apart from entities of  
these kinds, one might be a realist about things of  other kinds. For example, a 
moral realist might hold that there are moral facts. A mathematical realist might 
hold that numbers exist. A modal realist might hold that possible worlds exist. 
But one need not be a realist about these other things in order to be a realist in 
Devitt’s sense.
Commitment to the existence of  entities of  a certain kind is an important 
part of  being a realist. But commitment to the existence of  entities of  a certain 
kind does not distinguish realism from forms of  anti-realism such as idealism. An 
idealist may agree with the realist that items of  the kind in question exist. They 
exist in the mind or have mental existence. For the realist, it is not just existence 
that is important, but mind-independent existence. The things that exist must exist 
in an objective sense. They must exist independently of  thought. For example, a 
table does not depend on human thought for it to exist. Similarly, atoms and 
electrons do not depend for their existence on our believing that they exist.
While the realist insists on mind-independent existence, some qualifications 
are in order. It is important to note that not all mind-independent things are mind-
independent in the same way. Consider trees, rocks, atoms, mountains, oceans, the 
Earth, the solar system. These are naturally occurring entities. Such natural objects 
exist independently of  us. They would exist even if  we did not exist. But tables 
and chairs are not naturally occurring things. Would they exist if  we did not?
8 The terminology of  local and global realism is borrowed from Brock and Mares (2007, p. 11). 
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Tables and chairs are artefacts. Artefacts are built by us to perform specific 
functions. Because they are built to perform a function, they depend on us. We 
intend for an artefact such as a table or a chair to perform a specific function or set 
of  functions. In this sense, an artefact depends upon our intentions. Because they 
depend on our intentions, there is a sense in which artefacts depend on our minds. 
But, despite depending on our intentions, artefacts are still mind-independent 
entities. The continued existence of  tables and chairs does not depend on the 
continued existence of  humans or their minds. We might cease to exist. If  we 
cease to exist, the tables and chairs would still exist without us. One might perhaps 
wonder whether tables and chairs would still exist qua tables and chairs if  there 
were no humans left who might describe them as tables and chairs. But, whether 
or not there is anyone around to apply the words ‘table’ and ‘chair’ to the objects, 
the tables and chairs could survive our disappearance.9
Realism of  the kind that Devitt characterizes clearly extends to natural objects 
such as trees, birds, mountains, atoms, etc. It also applies to artefacts such as tables 
and chairs. It seems to be optional whether Devitt’s version of  realism must extend 
to such things as numbers or objective moral facts. For our purposes, it suffices 
to take realism to have the commitments to commonsense and scientific entities 
stipulated by Devitt. We may leave it open whether realism is to be extended to 
the other kinds of  things that I have mentioned.
6. arguMEnts For rEaLisM
Now that we have a handle on realism, let us turn to arguments that may be 
presented on behalf  of  realism. I will begin with the disarmingly simple proof  of  
an external world due to G. E. Moore. I will then present a second argument that 
employs inference to best explanation. Then I will consider Devitt’s naturalistic 
defence of  realism.
G. E. Moore’s proof  of  the external world is often discussed in the context 
of  Cartesian scepticism. But it may also be set within the context of  a response to 
idealism or other anti-realist denial of  the external world. Moore presents a proof  
of  the external world which is meant to establish the existence of  ordinary objects. 
9 There is a further type of  entity worth mentioning. Social entities such as football clubs 
are an interesting case. They are not physical things. But they have physical entities (humans) 
as members. They may be associated with a physical location (e.g. a football ground). If  a 
decision is made to disband the club, it will cease to exist. The existence of  such things does 
depend on mental activity.
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As such, it may be seen as an argument for commonsense realism rather than 
scientific realism. There is no apparent way to extend the argument to scientific 
realism, since it makes crucial use of  ostension of  observable entities. Here is the 
crucial quote from Moore:
I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my 
two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one 
hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. 
And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of  external things, you 
will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of  other ways: there is no need to 
multiply examples. ([1939]1993, pp. 165-6)
Moore assumes that we are able to prove the existence of  things such as hands 
in a perfectly mundane fashion, namely, by pointing to them. He notes that we 
routinely prove the existence of  things such as typographical errors on a page by 
pointing to them ([1939]1993, p. 167). In a similar way, we may prove the existence 
of  external things such as our hands by pointing to them. The procedure may 
be employed to prove the existence of  countless other things apart from hands. 
Because the method is able to be employed to prove the existence of  so many 
things, Moore takes it to serve as proof  of  the external world.
Interpretative questions abound with respect to the nature of  Moore’s proof. 
Moore himself  claims that it constitutes a rigorous proof  which satisfies three 
necessary conditions for proof  ([1939]1993, p. 166). Some commentators, such 
as James Pryor (2004), think that the basis of  the proof  is perceptual evidence 
for the existence of  external objects. Other commentators, such as William Lycan 
(2001), take Moore’s proof  to be a plausibility argument. Put simply, the claim 
that external things exist is more plausible than the controversial philosophical 
assumptions that are needed to argue that we may not know that external things 
exist. Moore’s proof  does not persuade everyone. Some think it incredibly naïve. 
But it is one way to argue for realism at the level of  ordinary objects. As we shall 
see, it intersects with Devitt’s naturalistic argument for realism.
The second line of  argument for realism that I wish to consider is one that 
makes use of  inference to best explanation (IBE). This line of  argument may be 
attractive to the realist who finds Moore’s proof  unpersuasive and who is troubled 
by the prospect of  Cartesian scepticism. Such a realist may think it possible that 
life is one big dream, that we are brains in a vat or subject to a massive illusion 
created by an evil demon. But, rather than succumb to scepticism, such a realist 
takes it to be a better explanation of  our actual experience that our commonsense 
view of  the world is correct. In particular, we inhabit a world of  material objects 
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that exist independently of  our minds. Bertrand Russell presented an argument 
along these lines:
There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of  life is a dream, 
in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this 
is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it is true; 
and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a means of  accounting for 
the facts of  our own life, than the common-sense hypothesis that there are really 
objects independent of  us, whose action on us causes our sensations. ([1912]1959, 
pp. 22-3)
Here Russell claims that the commonsense hypothesis is simpler than the 
hypothesis that “the whole of  life is a dream”. In effect, Russell takes the simplicity 
of  the hypothesis to indicate that it is a better explanation of  our experience than 
the alternative hypothesis that life is one big dream. As such, we should accept 
commonsense realism because it provides a better explanation than the alternative.
What is the relationship between the IBE argument for realism and the 
Moorean argument? The answer to this question depends on how Moore’s 
argument is interpreted. As previously indicated, one way to interpret Moore’s 
proof  is that it appeals to the perception of  external objects as the basis of  the 
proof. External objects such as Moore’s two hands are perceived rather than 
inferred entities. If  we take the point of  Moore’s proof  in this way, then his 
argument may differ significantly from the IBE argument for realism. For on 
the IBE argument external objects are inferred rather than perceived. But there 
is another way of  reading Moore. On this other reading, Moore is taken to argue 
on the basis of  comparative plausibility considerations. On this construal of  the 
argument, the alternative to believing that he is holding up two hands may be 
ruled out due to the implausibility of  the philosophical assumptions which must 
be made in order to throw into doubt the claim that he is holding up two hands. 
On this way of  reading Moore, his proof  has much in common with the IBE 
approach. One adopts the hypothesis that two hands are being held up because this 
hypothesis has greater plausibility than the alternative. As such, the proof  employs 
an inference rather than starting from perception. Moreover, the assessment that 
the hypothesis is more plausible than the alternative is similar to the assessment 
that the hypothesis is a better explanation than the alternative.
One problem with the IBE defence of  realism is that it is non-demonstrative. 
This is characteristic of  IBE arguments, which proceed by attempting to show 
that an explanation is better than alternative explanations, and should be adopted 
because it is the better explanation. The effectiveness of  the IBE defence of  realism 
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depends on realism being shown to be the best explanation as compared with the 
alternatives. This in turn must depend on what the criteria of  best explanation 
are taken to be. Though we may expect some agreement on explanatory criteria, 
such as simplicity or coherence with background knowledge, disagreement may 
be expected as well. Especially when it comes to metaphysical matters such as the 
issue of  realism, there is room for disagreement. Some philosophers may simply 
fail to agree that realism is the best explanation of  our experience. Indeed, some 
philosophers may find Putnam’s internal realism or a Kantian position to be a 
better explanation of  our experience than realism.
For a stronger case for realism, I turn to Devitt’s naturalistic defence of  
realism. Devitt’s argument on behalf  of  realism takes off  from the point that 
realism about ordinary objects plays a central role in common sense:
Realism about the ordinary observable physical world is a compelling 
doctrine. It is almost universally held outside intellectual circles. From an early age 
we come to believe that such objects as stones, cats, and trees exist. Furthermore, 
we believe that these objects exist even when we are not perceiving them, and that 
they do not depend for their existence on our opinions nor on anything mental. 
This realism about ordinary objects is confirmed day by day in our experience. It 
is central to our whole way of  viewing the world. Common-sense realism is aptly 
named because it is the core of  common sense. (2002, p. 18)
Realism about ordinary objects is the “core of  common sense”. And yet many 
philosophers reject commonsense realism. Devitt thinks the reason that 
philosophers reject commonsense realism in favour of  anti-realist positions is to 
be found in epistemology. Indeed, it stems from a priori epistemological theorizing. 
From a naturalistic perspective, such a priori epistemological theorizing has little 
merit, and is no basis on which to reject realism.
According to Devitt, the problem may be traced back to Descartes and the 
need to respond to Cartesian scepticism. Descartes posed the problem of  how 
we can know that there is an external world based on our senses. Traditional 
foundationalists respond that we may be certain of  that which is given to us in 
immediate experience, e.g. sense data. But it is difficult to provide a conclusive 
argument that the external world exists on the basis of  an appeal to our inner 
experiences. There is, Devitt says, “a ‘gap’ between the object known and the 
knowing mind” (2002, p. 20). Idealists sought to close the gap between mind and 
world by making the world mental. Kantians sought to close the gap by making 
the knowable world depend on our conceptual contribution. Devitt thinks that 
such epistemological theorizing prompted by the need to respond to Cartesian 
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 5, n.º 1 (2018): 27-50
Putnam’s Internal Realism in Retrospect 47
scepticism has led to “disaster”. It results either in rejection of  genuine knowledge 
of  the external world or in “truly bizarre metaphysics” (2002, p. 21).
What is the source of  the disaster? According to Devitt, the disaster is due to 
“epistemological speculations”:
…why should we have any confidence in these speculations? In particular, why 
should we have such confidence in them that they can undermine realism? Over 
a few years of  living people come to the conclusion that there are stones, trees, 
cats, and the like, existing largely independent of  us. This realism is confirmed 
day by day in their experience. A Moorean point is appropriate. Realism seems 
much more firmly based than the epistemological speculations that are thought 
to undermine it. Perhaps, then, we have started the argument in the wrong place: 
rather than using the epistemological speculations as evidence against realism, 
perhaps we should use realism as evidence against the speculations. (2002, p. 22)
Devitt takes realism about ordinary objects to be confirmed by our everyday 
experience. Epistemological speculation raises doubts about the existence of  
ordinary objects and threatens to undermine realism. But, Devitt asks, why should 
epistemological speculation carry weight against realism?
Devitt makes the “Moorean point” that the epistemological speculations should 
not be taken as seriously as realism.10 Realism is too well supported by experience 
for the speculations to seriously threaten it. Devitt adds a naturalistic touch to this 
Moorean response. He notes that the epistemological speculations have an a priori 
character, and should be rejected in favour of  a naturalistic approach:
…what support are these troubling speculations thought to have? Not the empirical 
support of  the claims of  science, for that sort of  support is itself  being doubted. 
The support is thought to be a priori, as is the support for our knowledge of  
mathematics and logic. Reflecting from the comfort of  armchairs, foundationalists 
and Kantians decide what knowledge must be like…
…the troubling epistemological speculations have no special status: they are simply 
some among many empirical hypotheses about the world we live in. As such, they 
do not compare in evidential support with realism. Experience has taught us a 
great deal about the world of  stones, trees, and cats, but rather little about how 
we know about this world. So epistemology is just the wrong place to start the 
argument: the sceptical challenge should be rejected. Instead, we should start with 
10 Given the way Devitt treats the “Moorean point”, his reading of  Moore appears closer to 
the Lycan-style plausibility comparison interpretation of  Moore than to Pryor’s perceptual 
warrant interpretation.
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an empirically based metaphysics and use that as evidence in an empirical study of  
what we can know and how we can know it; epistemology itself  becomes part of  
science, ‘naturalized epistemology’:
empirical metaphysics -> empirical epistemology.
And when we approach our metaphysics empirically, realism is irresistable. Indeed, 
it faces no rival we should take seriously. (2002, pp. 22-3)
In Devitt’s view, the problems for realism stem from a priori epistemological 
speculation. If  we reject a priori epistemology in favour of  a naturalistic approach, 
we may uphold realism. We may uphold realism because realism about ordinary 
objects is confirmed by experience. By contrast, the evidence for the epistemological 
speculation is less impressive than the evidence for realism. So we should reject 
the epistemological speculation and adopt realism instead.
Devitt’s naturalistic point against a priori epistemological speculations serves to 
bolster the case for realism. But, as Putnam himself  came to see, there is perhaps 
a further element that can be added to the case for realism.
7. dirECt rEaLisM
As is well known, Putnam changed his philosophical position on a number 
of  occasions over the course of  his career. Of  particular relevance in the present 
context, Putnam came to regard the internal realist position as mistaken. By around 
1990, Putnam had decided to renounce the position of  internal realism that he had 
defended since the mid-1970s. A crucial part of  his change of  mind was due to 
his recognition of  the importance of  the theory of  perception in thinking about 
realism. His later work on realism is characterized by a turn to direct realism, or, as 
he sometimes called it (following William James), “natural realism”.
A direct realist theory of  perception may be contrasted with an indirect realist 
theory of  perception (though these are not the only available alternatives). The 
best-known modern indirect realist theory is the sense-data theory. According to 
the sense-data theory, in perceiving an external object what one actually perceives 
is not the object itself, but a sense-datum which is a mental object within the mind 
of  the perceiving subject. By contrast with indirect realism, the direct realist holds 
that in perceiving an object in the world what is perceived is the object itself, not 
some internal mental state of  the subject.
The contrast between direct and indirect realist theories of  perception may 
seem to reflect a minor local dispute within the theory of  perception. But in 
turning away from internal realism, Putnam came to recognize that the dispute 
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is one with profound philosophical consequences. As he writes in his intellectual 
autobiography:
I began to think that the problem of  “access” to external objects … was a replay of  
the older problem of  epistemological dualism, even if  the dualism was no longer a 
dualism of  mental substance and physical substance, but one of  brain states and ev-
erything outside the head. I came to believe, and still believe today, that “natural real-
ism” with respect to perception can indeed be defended, and that with natural realism 
with respect to perception back in place the fear (or the bugaboo) that we may have 
no “access” to reality outside our heads can be dismissed as a bad dream. (2015, p. 83)
Thus, far from being a minor issue in the theory of  perception, Putnam sees 
the direct realist theory of  perception as playing an important role in the defence 
of  realism. What had made realism appear so problematic was the “Cartesian 
predicament” which presents us with the problem of  explaining how our minds 
come to accurately reflect the external world. What Putnam came to realize is 
that, with the adoption of  a direct realist theory of  perception, the problem of  
explaining how we may have access to reality is dissolved.
The point is not simply that adoption of  a direct realist theory of  perception 
may enable us to present a direct proof  of  external objects and thereby of  the 
external world (though this may indeed be the case). The point, rather, is that 
with the adoption of  direct realism the epistemological problem that has led 
philosophers down the well-worn path to anti-realist and idealist views is set 
aside. Once the Cartesian sceptical concerns that appeared to open a gaping 
chasm between mind and world are removed, the impetus toward such anti-realist 
positions disappears.
In sum, Putnam came to appreciate the important role played by perception 
in providing epistemic access to items in the mind-independent world. In this, 
he joins forces with a number of  recent philosophers who hold that purported 
problems with realism are due to mistaken views about the nature of  perception 
(e.g. Brewer, 2013; Searle, 2015). The shift to direct realism helps to extricate 
philosophy from the Cartesian predicament with its attendant threats of  scepticism 
about the external world and idealist rejections of  mind-independence. To my 
mind, the question that remains is whether direct realism can provide further 
support for realism about the unobservable entities of  theoretical science.
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